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COMMENTS
ANNUAL FEDERAL DEFICIT SPENDING:
SENDING THE JUDICIARY TO THE RESCUE
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' national debt, fueled by the annual
federal budget deficit,' is now a staggering $4 trillion.2 The
1993 deficit is forecasted to be $300 billion,3 and the annual
amount is expected to grow to $400 billion in the next ten
years.4 Financing the interest on the debt amounts to fifteen
percent of the national budget,5 or $200 billion annually.6 In
1992, the estimated percentage of the deficit compared to
gross domestic product was a staggering seventy percent.
7
During his 1992 campaign, President Clinton pledged to
reduce the annual deficit amount by one-half." However,
prior to taking office, Clinton realized this goal was too ambi-
tious given current economic conditions and the current
budget process.' During his first year as president, Clinton
© 1994 Ondrea D. Riley
1. A deficit is "an excess of expenditure over revenue." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 333 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 9th ed. 1989)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. Deficit spending is "the spending of public funds
raised by borrowing rather than by taxation." Id.
2. 139 CONG. REC. S10533 (1993) (interestingly, this amount is five times
the amount it was when Ronald Reagan took office in 1980). See also Don L.
Boroughs et al., What's Wrong with the American Economy, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 2, 1992, at 36, 37.
3. Boroughs, supra note 2, at 37. If nothing is done, the debt will climb to
$7 trillion by the turn of the century. 139 CONG. REC. S10533 (1993).
4. 139 CONG. REC. S10518-19 (1993).
5. Boroughs, supra note 2, at 51.
6. Bill Mintz, What You Should Know About the Deficit; $327 Billion
Shortfall Hits Americans Where They Live, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 17, 1993, at
1.
7. Boroughs, supra note 2, at 43.
8. William Neikirk, Clinton Economic Challenge: Find Money to Rebuild,
Cm. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1992, at 1, 34.
9. Because the 1992 deficit was $130 billion higher than it was in 1991,
Clinton has been forced to reject his planned middle-class tax cuts and will have
to reduce originally planned spending. Curtis Wilkie & Peter G. Gosselin,
577
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has tried many methods to cut spending, yet spending projec-
tions do not add up to an overall reduction in the deficit.' ° In
fact, during the 1993 budgetary process, individual Congress
members made twenty-nine attempts to cut spending, but
Congress ultimately rejected all of these cuts." Clinton has
also backed off of his promise to not tax the middle class.
12
The budget, as it now stands, includes an estimated total def-
icit reduction of only $500 billion over the next three years.' 3
Whether the deficit will actually be reduced is very
questionable.
What does this huge debt mean to our country, and what
can be done to solve the problem? While the Clinton adminis-
tration addresses the deficit problem, along with trying to
stimulate a stagnant economy, could a group of taxpayers un-
dertake a legal challenge to decrease or curtail deficit spend-
ing? Could a group of citizens or members of Congress inter-
ested in stopping the growth of the federal deficit sue the
federal government to force a balanced budget? Would the
judiciary be willing to address this ostensibly political issue?
This comment addresses whether the judiciary should re-
view a suit challenging the constitutionality of annual federal
deficit spending. Following a historical background of sug-
gested methods to curb the deficit and the constitutional re-
quirements for the judiciary to review a case, this comment
considers whether parties would have standing' 4 to sue the
Aides Say Clinton Camp Knew of Higher Deficit Estimates; Before Election,
Aides Knew Campaign Pledge Hard to Meet, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 1993, at
10.
10. 139 CONG. REc. S10531-32 (1993).
11. 139 CONG. REC. S10518 (1993).
12. 139 CONG. REC. H6299 (1993).
13. Id.
14. Standing to sue is a principle required by the courts where:
[A] party [must have a] sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable con-
troversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Standing is a concept utilized to deter-
mine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable
controversy is presented to the court; it is the right to take the initial
step that frames legal issues for ultimate adjudication by court or jury.
State Ex Rel. Cartwright v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n Okl., 653 P.2d
1230, 1232 (Oklahoma 1982). The requirement of "standing" is satis-
fied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectible and tan-
gible interest at stake in the litigation. Guidry v. Roberts, 331 So. 2d
44, 50 (L.A. Court of Appeals 1976) Standing is a jurisdictional issue
which concerns power of federal courts to hear and decide cases and
does not concern ultimate merits of substantive claims involved in the
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government and whether a federal court would find a justici-
able controversy.15 The judiciary is urged to adjudicate any
suit challenging the constitutionality of annual federal deficit
spending. Additionally, Congress could confer original juris-
diction to the United States Supreme Court to adjudicate all
challenges to deficit spending.
II. BACKGROUND
To better understand the national debt, the following
provides a brief synopsis of our nation's debt problems and
attempts to resolve annual deficit spending. Following this
synopsis is a discussion of the judicial constraints a court
would face if annual federal deficit spending were challenged.
action. Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684, 695
(D.C.Pa 1973) The doctrine emanates from the case or controversy re-
quirement of the Constitution and from general principles of judicial
administration, and seeks to insure that the plaintiff has alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure con-
crete adverseness. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F.
Supp. 689, 692 (E.D.Va. 1973).
Standing is a requirement that the plaintiffs have been injured or
been threatened with injury by governmental action complained of,
and focuses on the question of whether the litigant is the proper party
to fight the lawsuit, not whether the issue itself is justiciable. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431
F. Supp. 203, 218 (D.C.N.C. 1977)..[The] essence of standing is that no
person is entitled to assail the constitutionality of an ordinance or stat-
ute except as he himself is adversely affected by it. Sandoval v. Ryan,
Colo. App. 535 P.2d 244, 247 (1975).
BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLAcK's].
15. A justiciable controversy is:
A controversy in which a present and fixed claim of right is asserted
against one who has an interest in contesting it; rights must be de-
clared upon existing state of facts and not upon state of facts that may
or may not arise in future. A question as may properly come before a
tribunal for decision. Duart Mfg. Co. v. Philad. Co., 30 F. Supp. 777,
779, 780 (D.C.Del. 1939). Courts will only consider a "justiciable" con-
troversy, as distinguished from a hypothetical difference or dispute or
one that is academic or moot. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v . Hawthorn, 300
U.S. 227, 239 (1937). Term refers to real and substantial controversy
which is appropriate for judicial determination, as distinguished from
dispute or difference of contingent, hypothetical or abstract character.
State v. Nardini, 445 A. 2d 304, 307 (1982).
Id. at 865.
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A. History of the National Debt
Our nation began with a staggering debt that was almost
six times the current ratio of debt to income.16 The framers of
the United States Constitution abhorred the idea that an im-
mediate reduction of the debt was not in sight and insisted
that the debt be reduced as soon as possible. 17 While the
Constitution was being drafted, Alexander Hamilton ex-
pressed his humiliation that the new nation "owe[d] debts to
foreigners and to our own citizens.... These remain without
any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge." 18
The framers of the Constitution envisioned a national system
where monies would be spent only as they became avail-
able.19 Therefore, debt would be incurred only in emergency
situations, such as war.2 °
Reducing this debt was actually addressed, and by 1849,
revenues exceeded expenditures. 2 Until 1932, balanced or
surplus budgets were the norm.22 However, during the Great
Depression, the New Deal created spending pressures that
encouraged deficit spending.23 Since 1930, there have been
only eight surplus years,24 and our country has not had a
budget surplus since 1969.25 If deficit spending is left un-
checked, the national debt will most certainly continue to
grow.26
Lack of a precise means to enforce or even encourage a
balanced budget has resulted in continued deficit spending.
Reducing the annual deficit is critical to the country's eco-
16. Abner J. Mikva, Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the Power, 21
GA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1986).
17. S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 22 (1985).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
19. "[T]hat in the usual progress of things the necessities of a nation in
every stage of its existence will be found at least equal to its resources." THE
FEDERALIST No. 30, at 190 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
20. See id. at 192. "In the modem system of war, nations the most wealthy
are obliged to recourse to large loans." Id. at 192.
21. S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 39 (1985).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 24.
24. Id. at 39-40.
25. Id. at 40.
26. "[T]he federal budget deficit will remain between $244 billion and $331
billion until at least 1997." Boroughs, supra note 2, at 51.
27. See generally infra text accompanying notes 240-257.
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nomic health.28 The higher the debt rises, the more tax reve-
nue is necessary to finance the debt.29 Congress and the
President have continually emphasized the need to reduce
the deficit.3 ° The budget deficit is an increasingly important
topic in presidential and congressional campaigning, draws
much media attention, and is often blamed for the current
economic conditions. Yet, budget deficits continue in an up-
ward spiral.
The cause of the debt is often blamed on "log-rolling"31 or
"pork-barrel"32 spending. As "pork-barrel" spending contin-
ues, our deficit grows.33 The deficit outlook remains bleak.
With re-election campaigns always around the corner, the
legislative and executive branches are unwilling to make dif-
ficult decisions involving cuts in the budget. 4 Incumbent
members of Congress fear voter reprisal for budget cutbacks,
and thus our public debt continues to grow.35 In effect, mem-
bers of Congress have placed re-election interests above the
public's interests in controlling the debt.
28. Neikirk, supra note 8, at 24.
29. Id. at 24.
30. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985). See also Mintz,
supra note 6, at 1.
31. Legislative log-rolling is best described as a large bill that has many
different purposes. BLAcK's, supra note 14, at 942. For instance, a "log-rolled"
bill may include appropriations for child care and also appropriations for AIDS
funding.
32. Pork-barrel spending refers to situations where "a government project
or appropriation yield[s] benefits... to a political district and its political repre-
sentative." WEBSTER'S, supra note 1, at 916. Recently, "pork-barrel" federal
spending can be blamed for expenditures such as renovation of Lawrence
Welk's birthplace, and research on prickly pears. Mintz, supra note 6, at 1.
One member of Congress has aptly described "'pork barrel' spending on a bill as
lard[ing] it up with all kinds of junk [to] get Member's support." 139 CONG.
REC. S10531-32 (daily ed. August 5, 1993).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 86-94.
34. See S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985):
Members of Congress, thus, are free to respond to the concentrated
pressures of spending interest groups and reap the political advan-
tages of doing so - without having to reap concomitant political disad-
vantages by reducing spending programs favored by some other spend-
ing interests or by expressly raising taxes . . . .This result is an
essentially un-democratic and unresponsive process that enables mem-
bers of Congress to avoid ultimate accountability for their spending
and taxing decisions.
Id.
35. 139 CONG. REC. S10531-32 (daily ed. August 5, 1993). 'Budget cuts will
never materialize because [Congress does] not have the courage and guts to
stand up and vote the cuts now." Id.
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B. Constitutional Powers of Congressional Spending
Just how does Congress believe it has the power to spend
beyond revenues? The U.S Constitution grants the power to
Congress to "provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States."36 Among these powers is the
power "[t]o borrow Money on the credit of the United
States."37 The Constitution does not provide an answer to
whether it is appropriate to spend beyond revenues in periods
of peace.38 The United States Congress, however, has ac-
knowledged that debt should be incurred only for emergency
purposes. 9 Congress has also expressed concern about the
effects of the public debt on the nation's economy.40 But why
does Congress continue to spend monies beyond its means?
Is there any Constitutional limitation?
1. Limitations on Spending
If deficit spending is in fact constitutional, what limita-
tions does Congress face relative to the amount of money it
may borrow? The Constitution does not provide an answer.
Therefore, the meaning of the power to borrow must be inter-
preted. Generally, the meaning of ambiguous phrases is left
to Congressional interpretation.41 Where Congress crosses
the constitutional line, however, the courts must intervene. 42
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. Further, the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that the validity of the United States' public debt "shall not be ques-
tioned." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. In fact, it appears that the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in order to prevent Congress from "attack[ing] the
validity" of the debt. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-54 (1935). Con-
gress, therefore, cannot attempt to cancel the debts of the country and is not
free to ignore the country's pledges. Id. at 350-51.
38. See generally Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J.
1343 (1988). "Students of the Constitution have generally assumed that Con-
gress has exclusive authority to construe and implement the appropriations
clause and thus have not considered the possibility that Congress itself may
violate the clause." Id. at 1345 n.5.
39. S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1985) ("Congress attributes
the nation's economic problems to the debt and an 'unwritten constitution[al'
requirement of balanced budgets and a virtual absence of external constraints
upon the ability of Congress to spend.").
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409-10 (1819)
("The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it, the
duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be al-
lowed to select the means .... ).
42. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
582 [Vol. 34
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Congressional appropriations cannot be inconsistent
with the Constitution.43 In this situation, a dilemma arises
because the Constitution explicitly grants the power to Con-
gress to borrow money,44 but is silent as to when and where
exercising this power is appropriate. 45 The executive branch
is limited to spending monies that are appropriated by Con-
gress.4 6 It appears, however, that Congressional spending is
limited only to that which is "necessary and proper."
47
The limitations of the Necessary and Proper Clause were
vigorously debated, both before and immediately after the in-
ception of the Constitution.48 The judiciary historically has
been deferential when asked to define the meaning of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, interpreting the clause very
broadly and construing Congress' powers to tax and spend ex-
pansively. 49 As a result, the Necessary and Proper Clause is
43. See, e.g., id. ("The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is
written.").
44. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
46. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
47. Congress has the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers...." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
48. In discussing both the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy
Clause, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
These two clauses have been the sources of much virulent invective
and petulant declamation against the proposed constitution, they have
been held up to the people, in all the exaggerated colours of misrepre-
sentation, as the pernicious engines by which their local governments
were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated as the hideous
monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor
high nor low, nor sacred nor profane; and yet strange as it may appear,
after all this clamour, to those who may not have happened to contem-
plate them in the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect confi-
dence, that the constitutional operation of the intended government
would be precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated,
as if they were repeated in every article.
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-13 (1819).
49. A broad interpretation is most apparent by examining the meaning of
the Interstate Commerce Clause where Congress has found it "necessary and
proper" to regulate seemingly unconnected areas of the law. See, e.g., Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (finding
regulations for age discrimination of game wardens appropriate under Com-
merce Clause); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (loansharking is in
the stream of interstate commerce even if activities do not directly affect out-of-
state commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
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often used by Congress as a catch-all to spend, tax, or regu-
late broadly.50 The framers of the Constitution, however, rec-
ognized that the Court is the final interpreter of the
document.5 1
Because the limitations on Congress' powers to borrow
have not been addressed by the Court, Congress is left to de-
termine whether continuous deficit spending is within its
powers. Critics argue that Congress does not really have the
ability and drive to decide matters of constitutional import
such as the limitation of Congressional spending.52 This ar-
gument suggests that each member's main goal is to promote
the preferences of his or her own constituents in hopes of con-
tinued re-election.53 In fact, the legislature has been accused
of deferring matters of constitutional determination to the
courts as opposed to addressing these matters head-on.54
Perhaps the individual member does not have the ability to
separate his or her local concerns from considering whether
annual deficit spending is unconstitutional. 55
In addition to questioning whether annual deficit spend-
ing is "necessary and proper," another challenge to the deficit
is that it denies to future generations certain constitutional
rights such as equal protection, the right to representation,
and the right to majority rule.5" This argument purports that
the present generation unconstitutionally benefits from defi-
cit spending and pushes the burden to repay the deficit onto
future taxpayers.57 The annual deficit is therefore "analo-
gous to race and geographical discrimination."58 Future gen-
erations are not allowed to vote on legislation that will even-
tually affect them.59 Although this is a novel concept, a
challenge before a court is unlikely to prevail. The courts
(finding regulation that forbids hotels to refuse to rent to racial minorities is
appropriate regulation under Commerce Clause powers).
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
51. "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to
say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
52. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend
the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983).
53. See, e.g., id.
54. Id. at 587-88.
55. Id. at 588.
56. See Lester G. Lindley, The Deficit and the Constitution: A Betrayal of
Fundamental Values, 11 HAMLINE J. PuB. LAw & POL'Y. 255 (1985).
57. Id. at 255-56.
58. Id. at 257.
59. Id. at 258.
584 [Vol. 34
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have held that a concrete injury must be present for remedial
action.60 Since future generations challenging deficit spend-
ing would be alleging they will be harmed in the future, the
harm has not yet occurred. Therefore, "future generations,"
whomever they may be, would have no standing to sue.6 '
2. The Balance of Powers and Congressional Spending
The United States Constitution was developed to achieve
separate yet balanced power among the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government.62 Should Congress'
ability to spend beyond revenues be checked by the balance of
powers? In fact, the balance-of-powers issue was addressed
where both the legislative and executive branches were in-
volved in the budgetary process. 63 Concerns about the in-
fringement of the executive branch into the budgetary pro-
cess forced Congress to change the executive branch's role in
the process when President Richard Nixon impounded 64 mon-
ies appropriated by Congress. 65 As a result, additional legis-
lation was passed to limit the executive's power to impound
funds.66 Therefore, the judiciary may be reluctant to become
involved.
With respect to the power to tax and spend, Congress
often refers to itself as the ultimate power in the budget pro-
60. See generally infra text accompanying notes 143-208 for a discussion of
the standing requirements for various parties.
61. See generally infra text accompanying notes 143-208.
62. "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in
the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny .... That the three great departments of power should be separate and
distinct." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
63. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress
and executive must remain separate). See also Neil Devins, Budget Reform and
the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 993, 1018 (1990) ("[T]he transfer
of budgetary power from Congress to the President directly undermines major-
ity rule."). Interestingly, Congress set up the executive branch to be an integral
part of the budget-making process. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch.
18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) [hereinafter The 1921 Act].
64. Impounding of funds by the executive branch occurs when the President
'precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority by Congress."
BLACK'S, supra note 14, at 756.
65. See The Congressional Budget and Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 105 (1982), 2 U.S.C. §§ 621-88
(1982), and 31 U.S.C. (1976)) (which forced limitations on presidential im-
poundments) [hereinafter The 1974 Act].
66. See id.
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cess, an assertion supported by the Constitution. 7 Congress
has also suggested that the courts do not have the power to
consider whether congressional spending legislation is appro-
priate, since this would infringe upon congressional powers."
Moreover, the courts have historically followed the theory
that the legislature is best qualified to interpret the meaning
of Article I powers, and therefore the courts will bow to legis-
lative interpretation unless there appears to be a clear usur-
pation of constitutional powers.69 This presumption of legis-
lative validity is evident when examining the large number of
adjudicated cases regarding Congress' power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause and the broad interpretation the
Court has given to the phrase.7 °
C. Attempts to Reduce the Deficit
Congress has made many attempts to control and reduce
the deficit. The following illustrates of few of these attempts.
1. Legislation
There have been many futile attempts by Congress to re-
duce the federal deficit, including congressional limits on
agencies to prohibit spending beyond appropriations; 71 an act
that purposefully includes the President in the budgetary
process;72 several attempts at controlling the deficit through
legislative spending limits;7 3 and recently, a five-year plan to
67. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
68. See S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 66 (1985).
69. So long as there is a rational relation of means to ends, the act will be
held constitutional. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819).
70. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Red. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (holding that there is a rational basis for Congress to regulate private
mining under the Commerce Clause); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(determining that a trivial impact on commerce is sufficient for Congress to
regulate); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that labor stoppage has substantial effect on commerce
and Congress can regulate).
71. See, e.g., Act of May 1, 1820, ch. 52, § 6, 3 Stat. 567; Act of July 12, 1870,
ch. 251, § 7, 16 Stat. 230; Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 1214.
72. See The 1921 Act, supra note 63.
73. See, e.g., The 1974 Act, supra note 65; The Balanced Budget and Emer-
gency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, amended
by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 [hereinafter Gramm-Rudman].
586 [Vol. 34
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provide for additional reductions in the deficit.74 These at-
tempts have failed miserably.
75
In 1974, Congress made a significant attempt at budget-
ary reform through the Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act (The 1974 Act).76 Prior to the 1974 Act,
Congress addressed the budget in small, separate pieces and
not as a whole.77 The 1974 Act emphasized creating a more
ordered budget process and placing controls on presidential
impoundments.78 The 1974 Act created new committees, a
new budgetary process, new timetables for fiscal years, and
new deficit limits.79 Adherence to the strict timetable sched-
ules lasted only two years.80 Further, the 1974 Act did not
lead to a budgetary balance.81 The 1974 Act, however, did
force Congress to look at the budget's bottom line, as opposed
to previously separating receipts from expenditures.8 2
Continued attempts to reduce the deficit were made in
197883 and also in subsequent years.8 4 However, since these
attempts, Congress has effectively repealed the legislation by
continuing to adopt annual budget deficits.8 5
The most ambitious attempts by Congress to place strict
controls on the budget process are found in the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (more
commonly known as Gramm-Rudman).16 Gramm-Rudman
74. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-22 (supp. II 1990))
[hereinafter The 1990 Act].
75. See infra text accompanying notes 76-99.
76. The 1974 Act, supra note 65.
77. Gary A. Loxley & Thomas F. Mitola, Comment, The Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974: Gramm-Rudman and Beyond,
14 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 329, 333 (1987).
78. The 1974 Act, supra note 65. See also Philip G. Joyce & Robert D. Reis-
chauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29
H v. J. oN LEGIS. 429, 432 (1992).
79. The 1974 Act, supra note 65.
80. Loxley & Mitola, supra note 77, at 340.
81. In fact, the United States has had a budget deficit since 1969. S. REP.
No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 39 (1985).
82. Mikva, supra note 16, at 5.
83. Pub. L. No. 95-435, 92 Stat. 1051 (1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286e
(1982)).
84. See generally Loxley & Mitola, supra note 77, at 334-45 for discussion of
the many attempts by Congress to lower the deficit.
85. Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Fiscal Balance and the Federal Constitution, 11
GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 125, 132 (1988).
86. Gramm-Rudman, supra note 73.
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called for a phased-in reduction of the deficit over a six-year
period." Ultimately, the deficit was to be reduced to zero by
1991.88 Gramm-Rudman's demise began almost immedi-
ately.89 In the first year of Gramm-Rudman's existence, Con-
gress failed to meet its prescribed goals.90 Additionally, a
portion of Gramm-Rudman was deemed an unconstitutional
breach of the balance of powers.91 Gramm-Rudman's provi-
sion for a one-house veto was also found unconstitutional.92
These successful constitutional challenges, and Congress' in-
ability to meet Gramm-Rudman's goals, "triggered the ...
death knell of Gramm-Rudman."93
In November 1990, yet another budget plan was passed
by Congress (The 1990 Act).94 This five-year plan provided
for reductions in the deficit, an additional budgetary process
change, and spending caps.95 In its first year, the plan's ap-
plication met with relative success. 96 The 1990 Act left loop-
holes for Congress to spend beyond its means. These loop-
holes give Congress a provision to spend above the budget in
emergency situations and provide an allowance for economic
fluctuations.97 Additionally, Congress pushed some budget-
ary decisions into future years, which makes the first year
appear successful, but which also makes it more difficult to
meet the 1990 Act's goals in subsequent years.98 The Clinton
administration will therefore be forced to incorporate appro-
priations for the current year with appropriations from previ-
ous years. 99
2. Proposed Constitutional Amendments
A repeated suggestion to solve the nation's budgetary
problems is through the use of constitutional amendments
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
90. See Loxley & Mitola, supra note 77, at 347.
91. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress may not
reserve to itself the power to remove an appointed executive officer).
92. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
93. Loxley & Mitola, supra note 77, at 347.
94. The 1990 Act, supra note 74.
95. Id.
96. See Joyce & Reischauer, supra note 78, at 430.
97. The 1990 Act, supra note 74.
98. See Joyce & Reischauer, supra note 78, at 440.
99. Id. at 440.
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that require a balanced budget, allow the president a line-
item veto, or require that all appropriations be the "same
subject."100 However, critics suggest that most of these pro-
posals "merely pacify[ I the public outcry against the growing
budget deficit by proposing superficial alternatives of budget
reform."10
a. Proposed Amendments Requiring a Balanced
Budget
Congress has proposed several different constitutional
amendments to require a balanced budget.10 2 The proposed
amendments, however, have not been very strict, have left
loopholes for congressional override, and most significantly,
have not provided for enforcement in case Congress does not
meet the amendment's requirements.10 3 Suggested override
provisions allow Congress to spend beyond revenues if there
is a three-fifths approval by both the House and the Sen-
ate. 10 4 Congress defends the lack of enforceability provisions
on the basis that the budget power is strictly within its own
powers and that no other branch should, or constitutionally
can, enforce any provisions of an amendment. 10 5 Therefore,
Congress believes the judiciary should not, and cannot, be-
come involved in the process of enforcing these constitutional
amendments. 106
b. Presidential Line-Item Veto
Congress has also considered a constitutional amend-
ment to grant the President a line-item veto.' 0 7 A line-item
veto would allow the President to veto any given item in the
budget without being forced to veto or pass the package as a
100. See infra text accompanying notes 102-132.
101. Loxley & Mitola, supra note 77, at 358.
102. See generally id. at 334-45.
103. See generally id.
104. S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1985).
105. See id. at 64-71.
106. Id.
107. See S.J. RES. 30, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S166 (daily ed.
Jan. 25, 1989). Additionally, Congress has proposed legislation, as opposed to
constitutional amendment, to grant the president the line-item veto, but the
proposal failed to pass committee. S. REP. No. 92, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1985).
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whole. 108 These proposals have included a provision for Con-
gress to override the vetoed item by a two-thirds vote. 109
Critics argue that the line-item veto would shift the bal-
ance of powers by taking away purely congressional authority
to spend and unconstitutionally giving that authority to the
executive branch. 110 Although Congress is bound by majority
rule,"' it must then achieve a two-thirds vote to override a
single spending appropriation initially included in a bill
passed by a majority vote.' 12
Critics also believe the line-item veto is inappropriate be-
cause it is subject to partisan politics. 1 3 The President's
political party will be reluctant to override a veto by its own
President.1 1 4 Similarly, states with gubernatorial line-item
vetoes are criticized that legislators "pad" the budget with po-
litically popular appropriations, and thereby force the gover-
nor to make unpopular cuts through the exercise of the
veto.'1 5  Hence, the President will be reluctant to veto his or
108. See Courtney P. Odishaw, Note, Curbing Legislative Chaos: Executive
Choice or Congressional Responsibility?, 74 IowA L. REV. 227, 230 (1988).
109. Id. at 238. In fact, it has also been suggested that the President actu-
ally has the line-item veto and could simply go ahead and use it. See Stephen
Glazier, Reagan Already has Line Item Veto, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1987, at 14.
Supposedly, this power lies explicitly in the Constitution. Id. ("Every Bill
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If
he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it.. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 7, cl. 2. "Every Order, Resolution or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him .... " Id. cl. 3.) To
date, however, no President has tested this ability.
110. See Devins, supra note 63, at 1018. "Indeed, the transfer of budgetary
power from Congress to the President directly undermines majority rule."
111. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 5, 7. To override a presidential veto, the
House and Senate must gain two-thirds approval. Id. at § 7.
112. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
113. See Devins, supra note 63, at 1018. "This conclusion is buttressed by
the fact that members of the President's party are extremely reluctant to over-
ride veto decisions."
114. See id.
115. Id. at 1005-06. "'Legislators in states which have the line-item veto
routinely "pad" their budgets. It is a wonderful way for a Democratic-controlled
legislature to put a Republican Governor on the spot: Let him be the one to line-
item these issues that were either politically popular, or very emotional.'" Id.
(quoting Line-Item Veto: Hearings on S.J. Res. 26, S.J. Res. 178, and S. 1921
Before the Sub. Comm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984)).
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her own party's budgetary items. 116 Additionally, opponents
of the line-item veto also believe that the veto would not be
effective to control the deficit because any items vetoed would
have little impact.
117
By contrast, the executive branch favors the line-item
veto, believing that the present process creates an unconsti-
tutional imbalance of powers."" It is therefore appropriate
for the President to have the line-item veto, because it is
presently so difficult and too politically unpopular for the
President to veto a large bill when only one item does not
meet the President's approval." 9 Proponents believe that
the line-item veto would generate large spending cuts be-
cause it would not force the President into vetoing "all-or-
nothing ... mega bills."120 With a line-item veto, the Presi-
dent could cut wasteful items out of large bills without en-
dangering other important provisions, thereby helping to re-
store the balance of powers.' 2 '
c. Same-Subject Limitations
An additional suggestion to curb spending is a constitu-
tional amendment that requires all bills be limited to the
"same subject. " 1 22 Similar to the line-item veto, the same-
subject limitation would disallow omnibus 1
23 legislation.1 24
States with same-subject provisions, however, have found it
difficult to define the meaning of the term "same subject."
125
Some states require that the subjects be "reasonably ger-
mane" to one another. 126 The state of Florida requires bills to
relate to only one "government function.
" 127
116. Id. at 1019.
117. Id. at 1014.
118. S. REP. No. 92, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 12 (1985).
119. See id.
120. Devins, supra note 45, at 997.
121. Id. at 996-97.
122. See Nancy J. Townsend, Comment, Single Subject Restrictions as an Al-
ternative to the Line-Item Veto, 1 NOTRa DAME J.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 227,
227 n.4 (1985).
123. An omnibus bill is one that includes several separate and very different
items in one act where the executive must approve, or veto, the entire bill.
BLACK'S, supra note 14, at 1087.
124. See Odishaw, supra note 108, at 240.
125. Id. at 242.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 243.
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Proponents believe the same-subject restriction may be
an effective means to curb abusive legislative spending.12
The amendment may help to prevent legislators from hiding
obscure appropriations in large bills. 129 The same-subject
proposal's worst enemy, however, may be Congress itself.130
A member of Congress, accustomed to hiding obscure appro-
priations in large bills, may become exposed by the same-sub-
ject limitation and therefore not want to pass the amend-
ment. 13 1 If forced to choose an alternative, however,
Congress may favor adoption of the same-subject amendment
over the presidential line-item veto, because the same-subject
requirement may pose fewer separation-of-powers
problems. 3 2 However, it does seem possible, if not inevita-
ble, that the judiciary would be asked to interpret the term.
Regardless of efforts to pass a constitutional amendment,
none of these proposals have been successful. Because we are
left with the Constitution and with the interpretation of Con-
gress that annual spending beyond means is appropriate, a
challenge to that perception must be made. If a challenge
were brought, would a court elect to adjudicate the issue?
D. Historical Judicial Reluctance to Review Congressional
Matters
In order for the federal courts to review a matter of con-
stitutional import, several tests must be met, including those
of justiciability and standing.'3 3 The Court has suggested
that specific appropriations matters should be left to congres-
sional discretion and not be reviewed by the judiciary.13 1 If a
challenge involves matters beyond the validity of appropria-
tions, however, and attacks the overall constitutionality of
an action, judicial inquiry beyond mere deferential treatment
128. Id. at 245.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 246.
132. Id. at 247.
133. See generally infra text accompanying notes 143-227.
134. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-89 (1923). In fact,
Frothingham suggests that Congress has the power to legislate on any matter
that "touches upon the health, morals, education and prosperity of the people of
the United States." Id. at 466 (emphasis added). Perhaps we can question
whether the legislature is really improving the "prosperity" of our nation by
imposing such onerous debt.
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is appropriate. 135 In these situations, limitations on Con-
gress "can be preserved in practice no other way than
through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it
must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of
the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing." 136
Where the Supreme Court elects to review the validity of
congressional actions, it has historically applied a great de-
gree of deference to its review, usually beginning its analysis
with the presumption that congressional actions are constitu-
tional. 137 The Court generally will review only grievances
flowing from specific enumerated clauses in the Constitu-
tion,'3 ' and is likely to give deference to "perceived," as com-
pared to "actual," legislative intent. 139 When presented with
different readings of a statute, the courts will defer to the ob-
vious constitutional reading.' 40
At this time, we do not know whether the Court would be
similarly reluctant to review a challenge to annual deficit
spending. In prior attacks on single appropriations, the
Court has been concerned with standing' 4' or has not re-
135. "There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of con-
stitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohi-
bition of the Constitution .... " United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In these situations, the Court may elect to take a
more active role in the implementation of remedies to a problem, such as it has
done in the racial segregation cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
137. "[Wlhen Congressional legislation is under scrutiny, every rational trail
must be pursued to prevent collision between Congress and Court .... [A] de-
cree of unconstitutionality by [the] court is fraught with consequences so endur-
ing and far-reaching as to be avoided unless no choice is left in reason." United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 319 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
138. The Court, above and beyond "the broad standards of fairness written
into the Constitution (e.g. 'due process,' 'equal protection of the laws,' 'just com-
pensation') and the division of power as between States and Nation ... [will
look at a] second class of constitutional issues derive[d] from very specific provi-
sions of the Constitution." Id. at 321.
139. The judiciary is likely to give deference to legislative intent "so [as] to
deal with Congressional enactments as to avoid their invalidation unless a road
to any other decision is barred." Id. at 328.
140. "[Wlhen the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be
reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would be un-
constitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to adopt that construc-
tion which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity." United States v.
Delaware & Hudson Co. 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 143-208.
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viewed the challenge, fearing unconstitutional involvement
in another branch of government.142
1. Standing
In order for the courts to review a legislative act, the liti-
gant must have standing to sue.143 The main concern is
whether the party challenging the Congressional action is the
"proper party to request an adjudication of a particular is-
sue."144 Standing is present if the party can show injury in
fact. 145
Courts apply different tests, depending on the status the
party asserts as its basis for standing. 146 Several groups
could challenge the constitutionality of federal deficit spend-
ing. These include taxpayers, citizens, or members of
Congress.
a. Taxpayer Standing
An individual claiming that his or her taxpayer funds are
being used in an inappropriate manner will generally have
difficulty establishing standing to sue. 147 The Court, in Flast
142. See infra text accompanying notes 209-227.
143. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923):
The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that
the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally.
Id. at 488.
144. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 83, 101 (1967) (standing found where tax-
payers challenged federal spending as a violation of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses).
145. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (citations omitted); see
also, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("The gist of the question of
standing [is whether the party has] alleged such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assure [the] concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues. . . ."); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 411
(1792) (the court must find a concrete injury; otherwise, the opinion will only be
advisory, which is not allowed under the Constitution).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 147-208.
147. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-43
(1976) (the party must show a causal link between the defendant's action and
the alleged injury); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923). For a
party who attacks the validity of a specific appropriation, the standing hurdle is
difficult to jump because the taxpayer's injury is deemed so minute and the case
so tenuous. Id. Since the "interest in the moneys of the Treasury [is] shared
with millions of others [and] is comparatively minute and indeterminable [a
party who] suffers in some indefinite way in common with people" generally
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v. Cohen,148 however, allowed a taxpayer to sue where the
taxpayer directly challenged the constitutionality of a spend-
ing program as opposed to an "incidental expenditure," and a
"'logical' nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated" existed. 149 To establish such a
nexus, the taxpayer must show that the questioned legisla-
tion relies on congressional power to tax and spend under the
Constitution and that the program violates specific constitu-
tional limits and not Congress' general powers.' 50 While
Flast is still good law, it is very difficult for a litigant to meet
the strict standing test.' 5 '
The Constitution requires that the judiciary rule only on
issues where there is a concrete "case or controversy."' 5 2 A
concrete controversy exists where the court finds a causal
link between the challenged action and the plaintiff's in-
jury.153 Causation need not be virtually certain, and the liti-
gant need only show a "substantial likelihood" that the action
challenged caused the injury.15 4 The courts will also examine
whether the action is capable of redress by the judiciary.' 55
The Court has declined jurisdiction where it found the case
does not have standing to sue. Id. Frothingham, however, involved a challenge
to a single appropriation, and the Court was concerned that to allow this kind of
case could result in a proliferation of suits. Id. at 487. This case may be differ-
entiated from a single challenge to all deficit spending, since one determination
would make all other suits irrelevant.
148. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
149. Id. at 102.
150. Id. at 92-94.
151. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, Inc., 454
U.S. 464 (1982) (holding there is no standing for taxpayers alleging an Estab-
lishment Clause violation where the government gave away real estate to a
religious organization); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (hold-
ing taxpayer suing for use of funds by CIA does not have standing).
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) ("No principle is more fundamental to the
judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limi-
tation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.").
153. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221
(1974) ("Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court
... is capable of making decisions.").
154. Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20
(1978).
155. See, Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976)
("It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial
powers in this suit would result in the availability [of redress].").
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would be difficult to adjudicate, 151 or where the Court's power
to redress the problem was speculative. 1 7
Some Supreme Court Justices have indicated that if
there is an allegation that a constitutional provision was vio-
lated, the litigant automatically suffers sufficient injury to
sue.15 8 Justice Brennan, in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United, 59 suggested that standing should not be
the first inquiry.'6 0  Instead, the first question should be
whether the Constitution itself defines injury.' 6 1 Histori-
cally, however, strict injury requirements have been applied
such that an allegation of unconstitutional behavior does not
provide for automatic standing.
6 2
b. Citizen Standing
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the notion that citi-
zens can sue for a generalized injury. 16 3 This rejection is pri-
marily based on the challenger's inability to show a particu-
lar concrete injury.16 4 The Court has rationalized its position
by indicating that this type of standing has "no bounda-
ries."165 Hence, it has refused to allow cases consisting of a
"widespread class" encompassing every citizen's "right to
156. See, e.g., Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220 (holding that class action on be-
half of all United States citizens is too generalized and too difficult to adjudi-
cate); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (holding claim of tax-
payer funds used for CIA purposes too tenuous for redress).
157. See, e.g., Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 74 ("The more difficult step in the
standing inquiry is establishing that ... the exercise of the Court's remedial
powers would redress the claimed injury.").
158. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 492 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Brennan suggests that
a person should not be denied adjudication of a constitutional deprivation sim-
ply under the "rhetoric" that standing limitations impose. Id. at 493.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 492.
162. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 227 (1974). ("The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforce-
able by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of
those provisions has no boundaries.").
163. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (holding that tax-
payer's allegation of injury from statutory appropriation to states was too
generalized).
164. See, e.g., Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227. "[S]tanding to sue may not be
predicated upon an interest ... held in common by all members of the public
.... " Id. at 220.
165. Id. at 227.
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have a government that operates constitutionally."16 6 Be-
cause citizens must be able to show injury suffered from un-
constitutional action, a class, such as all American citizens,
will have a difficult time showing concrete injury from a spe-
cific challenge to congressional spending. 167 Whether a citi-
zen, or group of citizens, would have sufficient injury to chal-
lenge the overall constitutionality of annual deficit spending
has not yet been brought to the Court's attention.
c. Congressional Standing
Standing for a member of Congress was addressed where
the member sued the executive branch 16 and where a mem-
ber challenged the denial of the legislator's right to partici-
pate in the legislative process.' 6 9 Further, standing for a
member suing Congress has also been addressed. 7° The pri-
mary case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court involved find-
ing standing for a state legislator. 17 ' The legislator in Cole-
man v. Miller 172 alleged he was denied access to the
legislative process where he voted against ratification of a bill
and state officials sought to implement the bill.173 In Cole-
man, the Court granted standing to Kansas senators who had
voted against a Child Labor Amendment to the Federal Con-
166. Id.
167. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 485 (1982). The parties "fail to identify any personal injury suffered by
them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error. . . ." Id. at 485. But
see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973) (standing found where group alleged loss of enjoyment
of natural resources although there was no economic harm). In fact, the Court
in Students did not seem concerned that the injury is shared by many people.
Id. at 648.
168. See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S.
997 (1978) (members of Congress alleging unconstitutional composition of Fed-
eral Reserve System).
169. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S.
116 (1966) (both cases involved the denial of a Congress member's seat in
legislature).
170. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding senator
has standing to sue regarding pocket veto); Coleman v. Miller 307 U.S. 433
(1939) (holding that a state congressman has an interest in his own vote). But
see Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a congress-
man did not have concrete injury sufficient for standing to sue regarding illegal
activities of the CIA).
171. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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stitution.174 The legislative vote was evenly split, and the
Lieutenant Governor cast a vote in favor of the legislation.
175
The "passage" of the resolution was challenged by the sena-
tors who had voted against the bill, stating that the bill had
not properly received a majority vote. 176 The Court found
that the senators had a "plain, direct and adequate interest
in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes," and therefore
they suffered sufficient injury to find standing.177
Status as a member of Congress is not, on its own, suffi-
cient grounds for standing unless a concrete injury can be
shown. 178 The member must be able to show that his or her
congressional powers have in some way been abridged. 179 He
or she must show that some right, such as voting, has been
denied in order to demonstrate a concrete injury.'8 0 Further,
a court will ask if the injury "bear[s] upon ... [the] plaintiffs'
quite distinct and different duties" as a legislator in order to
find standing.''
As a further proposition, a member of Congress may also
allege that he or she has been indirectly injured as a result of
injury to the entire Congressional institution, which "in turn
injures him."'8 2 It is most important to remember that there
are no special standards for Congressional standing.'8 3 As
with other balance-of-powers concerns, when a court consid-
ers whether a Congress member has been injured, it will also
consider whether the court's action unconstitutionally inter-
174. Id. at 435.
175. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 436 (1939).
176. Id. at 438.
177. Id. at 438, 446.
178. See e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 197-98 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("[Gleneralized allegations do not provide a court with enough information as to
the particular interests at stake in the litigation. Thus, legislators, like all
other plaintiffs, must be precise in defining the particular interests which they
seek to vindicate in the federal court system.").
179. See id.
180. See Coleman v. Miller, 207 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).
181. Harrington, 553 F.2d at 199 (quoting Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611,
614 (D.C.Cir. 1973)).
182. Id. at n.41. ("Thus, the argument related to institutional injury is an
indirect or derivative argument in which the harm is traced through from the
institution to the individual member.").
183. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The standing
requirements are the same as for any other litigant regardless of whether the
interests and injuries asserted are different. Id.
[Vol. 34598
1994] DEFICIT SPENDING 599
feres with another branch of government.18 4 The courts' fail-
ure to make these considerations could "lead inevitably to the
intrusion of the courts into the proper affairs of the coequal
branches of government." 8 ' Thus, where there is a question
of separation of powers, the court will apply a very strict re-
quirement of "concrete, personal injury . . . so that federal
courts will not be thrust into the role of 'continuing monitors
of the wisdom and soundness of Executive [or legislative]
action.' "186
Recently, a district court found that several members of
Congress had standing when they banded together to enjoin
President Bush for his activities in the Persian Gulf.'8 7 The
members challenged activities by the President that had not
yet received congressional approval.'8 8 The members alleged
they were deprived of "the voice to which they are entitled
under the Constitution."'8 9 Because the issue was not ripe
for judgment,' 90 the question of standing did not go to a
higher court.' 9 ' The issue later became moot 92 and was not
184. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70. "In deference to the funda-
mental constitutional principle of separation of powers, the judiciary must take
special care to avoid intruding into a constitutionally delineated prerogative of
the Legislative Branch." Harrington, 553 F.2d at 214.
185. Harrington, 553 F.2d at 214.
186. Id. at 215 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
187. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1144.
190. A case is ripe when there is "a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, or sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant
the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498, 506 (1972) (citation omitted). See also BLAci's, supra note 14, at
1328. In Dellums, the court found the issue was not "ripe" because Congress
had not yet voted on the matter and therefore had not yet asserted its constitu-
tional authority. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1149-50. Therefore, there was not
yet a true confrontation between the legislative and executive branches. Id.
Further, the court found the issue not ripe because the executive branch had
not yet shown a "commitment to a definitive course of action" against Iraq to
substantiate a final decision of war. Id. at 1152.
191. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1144 n.3.
192. A case becomes moot "when a determination is sought on a matter
which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing contro-
versy." Leonhart v. McCormick, 395 F. Supp. 1073, 1077 (W.D. Pa. 1975). "A
question is moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues
have ceased to exist." Leak v. Lawson, 353 N.E.2d 345, 347 (1976). See also
BLACK's, supra note 14, at 1008.
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pursued. 193 It is noteworthy, however, that the court in Del-
lums believed that the judiciary has the power to adjudicate
issues that impact very political areas, such as foreign af-
fairs, that belong to other branches of government.1
9 4
The courts also found congressional standing where a
member of Congress challenged an act that allegedly granted
unconstitutional powers to another branch.1 95 In addition,
members of Congress were found to have standing where
they challenged the veto of a bill for which they had voted.'
96
The senators were found to have standing based on the feel-
ing that "[no] more essential interest could be asserted by a
legislator." 97  It remains to be seen whether the Supreme
Court would allow members of Congress to sue the congres-
sional body regarding budgetary matters.
A member of Congress may also attempt to bring suit as
a representative of his or her constituents.' 98 Representa-
tional standing has been limited to issues such as nullifica-
tion of a specific vote and has not expanded to the general
participation in the legislative process.' 99 Few members of
Congress have brought suit as representatives of their con-
stituents. 20 0 The legislator who sues as the voters' represen-
tative may have a stronger case if private plaintiffs join the
suit.20 1 One appellate court, however, has not allowed repre-
193. Congress approved President Bush's actions in the Persian Gulf on Jan-
uary 12, 1991, making the challenge moot. See Sara Fritz & William Eaton,
Congress Authorizes Gulf War, L.A. TIMES, January 13, 1991, at 1.
194. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1990) "[Ilt does not
follow that the judicial power is excluded from the resolution of cases merely
because they may touch upon [another branch's] affairs." Id.
195. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (finding there was a consti-
tutional infringement of the legislative branch on the executive branch; how-
ever, actual standing was granted to a private plaintiff and the issue was not
pursued further).
196. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Kennedy, the
President said he would veto a bill, and then he did not act. Id. at 432. The
parties who had approved the bill argued that the President's inaction caused
the bill to become law. Id.
197. Id. at 436.
198. See, e.g., Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 823 (1983) (standing found for Congress members suing on behalf of
constituents).
199. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
200. See, e.g., Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1166.
201. Id. at 1169 n.4.
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sentational standing.2 °2 Whether this method would be al-
lowed to go forward in the Supreme Court is questionable.
The test for traditional representational standing to sue
is found in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com-
mission.20 3 Hunt suggests that members of Congress would
be able to show standing if the constituents themselves would
have standing, the interests of the organization "are 'ger-
mane' to the organization's purpose[s]," and neither the claim
nor the relief requires the individuals to participate in the
action.204
Issues of ripeness are also matters where the judiciary
will be concerned.2°5 For instance, congressional standing
was rejected where the court felt the normal political process
had not been given a chance to resolve the issue.20 6
Some suggest that the courts should be very cautious in
granting congressional standing because the legislator, based
on the nature of his or her office, has "special access to the
political processes through which general constitutional
grievances should find redress."20 7 Therefore, it is not often
necessary for a member of Congress to seek redress through
the courts, because he or she can seek such redress through
the legislative process.208
202. McKinney v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 614 F. Supp. 1226
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also R. Law-
rence Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote is This Anyway?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1986).
203. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
204. Id. at 343.
205. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,
273 (1941) ("Basically, the question in each case is whether.., there is a sub-
stantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of suffi-
cient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a... judgment.").
206. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (Powell, J. concurring) (hold-
ing confrontation between executive and legislative branches is not certain to
occur). See also, e.g., Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 877
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981) (leaving the matter to be ad-
dressed by the Congress members' colleagues). Whether the political process
and public concern acted upon through the voting process will eventually re-
solve such challenged issues is an open question.
207. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 710. See also, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106 (1976).
208. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 710. See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) ("Our system of government leaves
many crucial decisions to the political processes.").
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2. Justiciability
The courts may also decline to review matters based on
the political question doctrine209 where a court determines it
is unwise to decide the issues,21 ° or where a court concludes
issues are assigned by the Constitution to other branches of
government. 21
1
a. Political Question Doctrine
Courts look at several factors to decide whether a case is
not justiciable based on the political question doctrine.212
These factors include the commitment of the issue to another
coordinate branch of government, the lack of "judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving" the issue,
the impossibility of deciding an issue without first determin-
ing policy, the risk that resolution could result in lack of re-
spect for another branch of government, the possibility that
the political decision is already made, or the potential for
"embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by vari-
ous departments on one question."213 If one of these factors is
not present, "there should be no dismissal for non-jus-
ticiability on the ground of a political question's presence."214
In looking at these various factors, the Supreme Court has
declined to decide cases, for example, involving discipline of
the militia, where the sole constitutional authority to regu-
209. See infra text accompanying notes 212-219. "Political questions" are
those of which the "courts will refuse to take cognizance, or to decide on account
of their purely political character, or because their determination would involve
an encroachment upon the executive or legislative powers." BLACK's, supra
note 14, at 1158-59.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 220-227.
211. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 217. In fact, it can be argued that the Court has actually
become involved in areas that could be considered political or could be seen to
embarrass another branch. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)
(striking down congressional retention of right to exclude executive appoint-
ment from budgetary process); INS. v. Chadha, 466 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking
down one-house veto provision); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(denying absolute immunity to the Presidential office); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating death penalty statutes). See also Robert F. Nagel,
Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doc-
trine, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 643, 650 (1989) ("The irony is that... the role of the
federal courts in managing public institutions and public policy ha[s] grown
significantly.").
214. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
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late is with the congressional and executive branches,215 and
involving the constitutional amendment process.216
The political question analysis may still be applied if a
constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget were
implemented and challenged.21 7 Critics argue that the judici-
ary still may not be able to enforce the amendment's provi-
sions, because doing so would exceed constitutional limits. 21 8
This premise suggests that notions such as standing and the
political question doctrine are simply too problematic, and
therefore the judiciary is not the proper organization to re-
solve these issues.21 9
b. Prudential Concerns
The judiciary is not required to review all cases. 220 The
courts, at their own discretion, can refuse to review any case,
as they deem appropriate. 221 The impact of the ability to
deny review is illustrated by considering the large number of
cases denied review by the Supreme Court.222
The ability to decline jurisdiction because the court does
not find it "prudential" has been debated over the centu-
223 2ries. Justice Marshall, in Cohen v. Virginia,224  felt
strongly that the courts should not decline jurisdiction at
whim and rather must show good reason to deny review
where a party appeals to the court and has standing to sue.225
215. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (declining to review
training, weaponry, and standing orders of the National Guard which are re-
sponsibilities vested in the legislative and executive branches).
216. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939) (holding that review
of constitutional amendment ratification process is not within the bounds of
judicial review).
217. See Gay A. Crosthwait, Note, Article III Problems in Enforcing the Bal-
anced Budget Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1065, 1105 (1983) ("[Finding the
Amendment justiciable because of explicit textual assertion or judicial decision
will alter the balance of powers in the federal government and at the same time
transform current notions of justiciability.").
218. Id.
219. See id. at 1105-07.
220. In 1988, almost all of the Supreme Court's "mandatory" jurisdiction was
eliminated by legislation, and the Court was given discretionary review by writ
of certiorari. 102 Stat. 662, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988).
221. Id.
222. Recently, the Supreme Court refused review of all cases on two appel-
late dockets. Supreme Court Proceedings, U.S. LAw WEEK, Jan. 19, 1993, at 1.
223. See infra text accompanying notes 224-227.
224. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
225. Id. at 403:
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Justice Brandeis, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Author-
ity,226 however, felt quite differently and listed several condi-
tions where the courts should decline jurisdiction.227 The
courts' ability to decline review could easily stop a challenge
to annual deficit spending dead in its tracks.
E. Congress Granting Original Jurisdiction or Standing
An additional method for standing or jurisdiction to be
proper before the Supreme Court is through congressional
grant. Congress has the ability, through the Constitution, to
confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court,228 and may
also impose more favorable standing rules. 229 The plaintiff,
[I]t is equally true, that [the Court] must take jurisdiction if it should.
The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because
it approaches the confines of the constitution .... We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given.
Id.
226. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
227. Areas where courts should decline jurisdiction, according to Brandeis,
include:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legisla-
tion in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding...
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it."
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied."
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question.., if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute
at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in ques-
tion, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.
Id. at 346-47 (citations omitted).
228. "The Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. See also Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S.
506, 513-14 (1868) (finding that a Congressional act established judicial courts
and impliedly granted appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court).
229. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 492 n.2 (1982) "'Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights,
the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist with-
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however, must still satisfy the minimum standing tests: the
presence of an actual or threatened injury that is causally
connected to the allegedly unconstitutional conduct and that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.2 3 ° Satisfac-
tion of these tests will thus meet the Constitutional require-
ment for a concrete "case or controversy."
231
III. ANALYSIS
A court has many methods available by which it may re-
fuse to review a case. Whether this refusal is appropriate has
been hotly debated.23 2 A challenge to the constitutionality of
deficit spending has yet to leap through the justiciability
analysis. If such a challenge were brought, how would the
courts analyze it? Is deficit spending constitutional? Should
the courts elect to review this type of challenge?
A. Annual Deficit Spending as Envisioned by the Framers
of the Constitution
As stated above, the level of debt prior to implementation
of the Constitution was extremely high compared to total na-
tional income.233 The framers of the Constitution regarded
the debt as tolerable only because it was directly related to
the cost of war.234 Accordingly, debt reduction was an ex-
treme "necessity."235  The framers assumed that the debt
would be reduced, and in fact, the debt was reduced by
1849.236 Thus, one reason the "power to borrow" was not fur-
ther defined in the Constitution is that the framers did not
envision the possibility that deficit spending, would continue
on an annual basis.
Members of Congress have acknowledged that the fram-
ers of the Constitution did not intend annual deficit spend-
ing.231 Recently, a Congressional committee reported that
"[b]oth Hamilton and Jefferson were in agreement, that
out the statute.'" Id. (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3
(1973)).
230. See generally supra text accompanying notes 143-208.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 152-153.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 220-227.
233. See Mikva, supra note 16, at 6.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
236. S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 39 (1985).
237. Id. at 22.
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whatever debt happened to be accrued by a nation, it ought to
be repaid within some prescribed period of time. In Jeffer-
son's view, the profligacy of one generation ought not to for-
ever burden its successors."238
Perhaps this simple analysis is enough to suggest that
annual deficit spending is unconstitutional. If so, why does
the United States government continue to spend beyond its
means? Perhaps this conduct continues because annual defi-
cit spending has not yet been challenged in the courts. The
choice to continue deficit spending has therefore been left
solely to the legislators. Left unchecked, our congressional
representatives will not address the issue head-on, but will
continue to spend.
B. Lack of Means to Enforce a Balanced Budget Allows for
Continuation of Deficit Spending
Congress and the President have tried many ways to
curb spending but have been unable to meet their own
goals.239 Without enforceability provisions or the threat of
override of the budgetary process, Congress will continue to
spend with no repercussions. Mere threats of future eco-
nomic hardship will never be enough to convince Congress
that a balanced budget is a necessity. Any constitutional
amendment or legislation must have some type of enforce-
ability provision to ensure that Congress will not simply over-
ride the legislation or ignore its existence. As the present
system works, Congress is not required to answer to anyone
but itself. Surely this is not the balance of powers that our
founding fathers envisioned. If Congress cannot control it-
self, other branches of the government must step in.
C. Why the Proposed Constitutional Amendments Will Not
Work
The proposals for a constitutional amendment to require
a balanced budget, line-item veto, or same-subject restric-
tions are unworkable. They do not provide for enforceability
provisions, they are subject to partisan politics, and they are
subject to broad and differing interpretations.
238. Id.
239. See generally supra text accompanying notes 71-132.
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1. The Balanced Budget Amendment Proposals Are
Not the Answer
A provision requiring a balanced budget through consti-
tutional amendment is both redundant to the Constitution
and, without enforceability provisions, unworkable. A consti-
tutional amendment may be redundant because there is indi-
cation that Congress in fact believes there is an "unwritten
constitution[al]" requirement for a balanced budget.24 ° Fur-
ther, our founding fathers expressed the intent that the
power to borrow was to be used only when it is necessary.2 4'
It would be duplication of effort to adopt an amendment that
requires a balanced budget because such a requirement may
already exist, considering these statements by Congress and
the original intent of the framers of the Constitution. Hence,
a constitutional amendment is not the best place to concen-
trate our efforts.
Provisions that allow Congress to override a balanced
budget by a three-fifths vote 242 also make a balanced budget
amendment unworkable. Congress has historically been es-
pecially sensitive to constituency and special-interest-group
pressures. Because of these pressures, it may be just as easy
for Congress to approve a deficit after a constitutional
amendment as it is to currently approve a deficit by majority
vote. A three-fifths majority vote does not require many more
votes than a majority vote.243 Conceivably, it would not be
too difficult for Congress to shirk its fiscal responsibilities by
overriding the constitutional amendment. The only real sav-
ing grace may be the public outcry against a representative
or senator who votes to continue a deficit year. It is unlikely,
however, that the public would become outraged over a "lit-
tle" matter such as approving a deficit, especially since the
American public has become so accustomed to deficit
financing.244
240. S. REP. No. 162 at 3.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
242. S. REP. No. 162 at 2.
243. An additional nine votes would be necessary in the Senate and forty-
three in the House.
244. The public has become accustomed to politicians breaking the rules.
For example, the public was recently able to look past senatorial candidates
who bounced hundreds of checks. See Max Boot, Capital Hill Scandal-Watch
Continues After Election, THE CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Dec. 15, 1992, at 9.
U.S. citizens are well accustomed to budget deficits. In fact, anyone born after
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Most significantly, the absence of any enforceability pro-
visions in the proposed amendments make a balanced budget
amendment completely unworkable. Unless there is some
threat of repercussion, whether it be automatic appropria-
tions cuts or, more appropriately, impeachment from office
for not balancing the budget, Congress will continue to accept
annual deficit spending, and the deficit will grow.
2. The Presidential Line-Item Veto
Although the presidential line-item veto may help to cut
some items from the annual budget, the line-item veto cannot
be the sole answer to our budgetary woes. Because the Presi-
dent's actions are also subject to partisan politics, it is plausi-
ble that the only items vetoed would be those favorable to
political opponents, and the President's own party would be
unlikely to support an override of such a veto.245 Further,
Congress, in anticipation of a potential line-item veto, may
"pad" the budget, as legislatures in states with gubernatorial
line-item veto provisions are accused.246 If this were to hap-
pen, our budgetary woes would be even greater, because the
executive branch would be forced to look at the budget as a
whole and would also be forced to look for "padded" provi-
sions. With implementation of a line-item veto, Congress
may leave the sticky, unpopular decisions to the President
and force him or her to make the unpopular spending cuts.247
The balance-of-powers concerns are the most persuasive
arguments against the presidential line-item veto. The line-
item veto appears to push the executive branch into areas
designated by the Constitution to belong to the legislature.2 48
Where a majority vote was once necessary to pass an appro-
1969 has never experienced a surplus year. See supra text accompanying note
25.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 113-117.
246. See Devins, supra note 63, at 1005-06. See also supra text accompany-
ing note 115.
247. Devins, supra note 63, at 1006. "'[W]hen a legislator, even though op-
posed in principle to an appropriation, is reasonably certain that the governor
will slice it down to more moderate size, he is tempted to bolster himself politi-
cally by voting [in favor of the bill].'" Id. (quoting McGreary, The Governor's
Veto in Pennsylvania, 41 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 941, 943 (1947)).
248. Id. at 1018. "Indeed the transfer of budgetary power from Congress to
the President directly undermines majority rule .... [S]tructural reform, then,




priation, the President, unlimited in the number of line items
that can be vetoed, in effect could force Congress to approve
an indefinite amount of appropriations with a two-thirds
vote.249 This could, at the very extreme, completely destroy
the constitutional notion of congressional majority rule.25 °
Because of these separation-of-powers concerns and the
threat of padded budgets, the line-item veto does not provide
an answer to the nation's financial difficulties.
3. Same-Subject Limitations
Much like the line-item veto, same-subject limitations for
Congressional appropriations are also not the primary candi-
dates for solving the national deficit problem. Although the
provisions may help to prevent legislators from "hiding the
ball," defining the term "same subject" is a problem. 251 The
danger with this type of amendment is that the term "same
subject" could be subject to substantially differing interpreta-
tions by the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, and
no consensus for the definition could be found.252
Because there may be differing interpretations of the
term, it is likely the judiciary would eventually be asked to
interpret the meaning of "same subject."253 If the judiciary
elected to apply a strict interpretation of the phrase, the
amendment may be successful in squeezing out absurd ap-
propriations that do not conform to the amendment.25 4 If the
judiciary defers to the legislature's interpretation of "same
subject," however, which no doubt would be very broad, the
amendment may have little or no impact on overall spending.
The amendment's goal to keep absurd appropriations out of
large bills would be lost, and a large change in the budget
process would not occur.255
An additional potential risk of the same-subject limita-
tion is that it could create the fragmented budgetary process
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 125-127.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 125-132.
253. See Odishaw, supra note 108, at 242-44.
254. Id. at 246-47.
255. Id. at 243. "Thus, the case law reveals that single subject restrictions,
though similar in form, may have different consequences depending upon
whether the courts within the jurisdiction apply a liberal or a strict standard
for defining what compromises a single subject." Id. at 243.
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that the Act of 1974 intended to eliminate. 256 The same-sub-
ject limitation may make it more difficult for Congress to put
all of the pieces of separate bills together to determine the
total budgetary impact. With a concentrated effort on defin-
ing the term "same subject," however, application of the
amendment may help to prevent the "log-rolling"25 7 of ob-
scure appropriations hidden in huge umbrella bills.
Of the proposed constitutional amendments, the same-
subject limitation seems to cause the fewest separation-of-
powers concerns because it encompasses only the legislative
branch of the government. A well crafted bill outlining a spe-
cific, narrow definition of the term may, at the very least, be a
small band-aid for a gushing wound. As with other propos-
als, the "same subject" limitations must have enforceability
provisions or they simply will not work.
D. Congress Has Provided Its Definition of Appropriate
Deficit Spending Through Its Prior Actions
Considering all of the failed congressional attempts at
deficit reduction, including budgetary acts and proposed con-
stitutional amendments, it becomes clear that our current
congressional system is incapable of resolving the deficit
problem.258 Congress cannot meet its own goals, and its
members are not willing to make decisions that could hurt
their chances for re-election. 259 As a result, deficit spending
will continue to skyrocket.
By adopting all of these budgetary actions and proposing
constitutional amendments and legislation aimed at the re-
duction of the public debt, Congress has actually defined the
limits of its constitutional power and the associated "neces-
sary and proper" means to further its spending goals. It has,
in effect, pronounced it "necessary and proper" to reduce the
debt.26 0 By doing this, Congress has implicitly set a level of
review, or benchmark, for the judiciary to use in determining
whether the debt is constitutional. In has, in effect, pro-
256. See generally supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
257. See supra 31 for explanation of "log-rolling."
258. See generally supra text accompanying notes 71-132.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 71-132. In fact, one member of Con-
gress has gone so far as to say Congress had "done virtually nothing for the last
12 years" to curb deficit spending. 139 CONG. REC. S10533 (daily ed. Aug. 5,
1993) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
260. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985).
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claimed that deficit spending is wrong, that the government
must do something about it, and that Congress is incapable of
doing it alone.
Since Congress has defined the meaning of its power to
borrow, it has provided a basis for a party to have standing to
sue. The party can therefore show more than a generalized
grievance, as required by Flast,261 by pointing to a specific
portion of the Constitution that has been violated. The party
can allege a direct violation of a specific clause of the Consti-
tution (Congress' power to borrow), and allege that annual
deficit spending is inappropriate unless done in emergencies,
such as war.
E. Justiciability Concerns
For a party to challenge the constitutionality of deficit
spending, the traditional notions of justiciability will be con-
sidered by the court.262
1. Standing
For a court to review a challenge to annual deficit spend-
ing, the party must have standing to sue.263 A variety of po-
tential litigants would raise different standing issues were
they to sue regarding the constitutionality of annual deficit
spending. These litigants include individuals and members
of Congress.
a. Individual Standing
For an individual to challenge the constitutionality of an-
nual deficit spending, the party must be able to show that
actual injury resulted from the conduct in question.264 There
are several bases for an individual to allege that he or she has
been injured by deficit spending. For instance, the party
could allege that his or her dollars paid through taxes are
used to fund an unconstitutional deficit. Therefore, the per-
centage of the budget, and the corresponding percentage of
his or her taxpayer dollars, were used for purposes resulting
in cuts in benefits or programs to the taxpayer, loss of jobs, or
loss of spending power. For example, a group, such as busi-
261. See supra text accompanying notes 148-151.
262. See generally supra text accompanying notes 133-227.
263. See generally supra text accompanying notes 143-146.
264. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923).
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ness and banking professionals, may attempt to sue based on
increased interest rates due to governmental borrowing.2 6
The judiciary has been reluctant to allow taxpayers to
sue for generalized claims regarding the use of the taxpayers'
money for particular projects.266 These cases, however, have
attacked specific uses of the funds and specific appropria-
tions.267 Where a litigant attacks a small piece of the budget-
ary process, injury is even more difficult to prove. 268 To avoid
standing problems, it would be prudent for the party to allege
that overall deficit spending is unconstitutional, as opposed
to attacking the constitutionality of a specific appropriation.
Above and beyond a possible loss of job or cut in benefits, a
taxpayer could argue that because fifteen percent of our na-
tion's budget finances the debt, the taxpayer has suffered a
significant injury, because fifteen percent of his or her taxes
are used to pay the interest on the debt. 269 This amount may
be more ominous than attacking a specific appropriation,
which would be minute once distributed among all taxpaying
citizens.2 7 0 Fifteen percent of a taxpayer's total amount of
taxes paid could be quite sufficient to show an injury in
fact. 271
Although the Flast test for taxpayer standing is very dif-
ficult to meet, the case of a taxpayer alleging that Congress
has exceeded its constitutional limits under the Taxing and
Spending Clause may provide the "logical nexus" appropriate
to meet the Flast standing test.272 Because the taxpayer
would be challenging such a large portion of congressional
spending funded by a large portion of his or her own tax bill,
265. Crosthwait, supra note 217, at 1075. However, this argument may not
now be appropriate since interest rates are at their lowest in years.
266. See, e.g., Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487. ("The administration of any
statute, likely to produce additional taxation to be imposed upon a vast number
of taxpayers, the extent of whose several liability is indefinite and constantly
changing, is essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern.").
267. See, e.g., id.
268. See, e.g., id.
269. See supra text accompanying note 5.
270. Instead of attacking a specific appropriation, "[t]he complaint should be
carefully phrased to ensure that it attacks unconstitutional congressional en-
actment of law and not executive execution of an unconstitutional law."
Crosthwait, supra note 217, at 1079-80 (discussing whether a taxpayer would
have standing to sue for enforcement of a balanced budget amendment).
271. For example, a party that pays $10,000 in taxes has $1500 appropriated
to financing the debt. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 5.
272. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1967).
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the resulting injury is more than sufficient to meet standing
requirements, and therefore a "logical nexus" exists.273 This
injury is beyond that of a person alleging just that a constitu-
tional amendment has been violated, because the injury is
measurable in dollars and cents, where "the essence of an
amendment violation is that Congress spend funds without
raising tax revenues."274
If the taxpayer could show that his or her benefits under
a program such as Medicare had recently been cut, it would
strengthen his or her ability to show a "logical nexus" be-
tween annual deficit spending and personal injury. Institu-
tions that receive funds from the federal government may
also be able to show a "logical nexus" between an increased
debt and cuts in benefits or programs. Taxpayers, or parties
affected by budget cuts necessary to finance the deficit, are
therefore not just airing generalized grievances, as prohibited
by the Court. 5
The Court has previously been concerned that allowing
taxpayers standing to sue would result in a proliferation of
suits. 276 The plaintiff, however, would be attacking the over-
all constitutionality of deficit spending and not just single ap-
propriations; thus, the concern is unjustified. Resolving
whether annual deficit spending is constitutional, one way or
the other, would solve the problem, and no additional tax-
payer suits would be necessary after an initial suit was
decided.
Further, the injury must be "likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision."277 If deficit spending is found unconsti-
tutional, a party whose Medicare benefits have been cut may
find it difficult to argue that the injury will be definitively
redressed by a judicial decision. Were a group of citizens
with various injuries, however, to sue as a class challenging
cuts in multiple benefits that resulted from annual deficit
spending, the argument may be stronger that the injuries
would be redressed by a favorable decision.
273. See id.
274. Crosthwait, supra note 217, at 1081.
275. See generally supra text accompanying notes 143-146.
276. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923). See also,
e.g., supra note 147.
277. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
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In this same arena, the courts may also be concerned
with what remedy is sought by the plaintiffs. 278 Because the
courts cannot issue advisory opinions,279 they may be reluc-
tant to prescribe any methods by which a budget should be
balanced. Additionally, they may be concerned that there
would be additional infringements on other branches of the
government from any decision.28 ° Whoever brings suit must
be careful how he or she drafts the request for relief. For in-
stance the plaintiff(s) could urge that the Court issue a pro-
nouncement such as it did in Brown v. Board of Education,21
asking the courts to make changes "with all deliberate
speed,"25 2 but not prescribing the actual means by which to
accomplish the task. The Court in Brown recognized that
"full implementation of the[ ] constitutional principles
[would] require solution[s]" at the local level.283 Moreover, a
court, in challenging the constitutionality of deficit spending,
could relegate the proper method for resolution of the matter
to Congress, since Congress is closer to the matter. This
would allow the Court to rule on the action, but leave the
means for rectifying the situation to Congress.28 4
b. Congress Member Standing
Individual members of Congress could also challenge the
constitutionality of annual deficit spending. An appellate
court has recognized that "there are no special standards for
determining congressional standing questions."285 It ap-
pears, however, that if a member of Congress challenged an-
nual deficit spending, he or she would have several distinct
standing hurdles to jump. It has been suggested that a mem-
ber of Congress, alleging unconstitutional conduct on the part
of Congress, may be able to assert his or her rights in a judi-
278. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
279. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409 (1792).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
281. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
282. Id. at 301.
283. Id. at 299.
284. The courts also may question what a drastic cut in spending would do to
the nation's economy; however, one author suggests that the judiciary should
not be concerned with economic areas when deciding matters of constitutional
import. D. Regan, Remarks at the Hearings H.J. Res. 350 Before the Sub.
Comm. on House Judiciary Comm. 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
285. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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cial arena.286 The member of Congress can allege that his or
her rights as a legislator are abrogated by unconstitutional
congressional behavior.28 7
Were a member of Congress to allege that his or her leg-
islative rights have been taken away through the regular use
of deficit financing, he or she may have a stronger case, be-
cause a challenge to an actual infringement of a congres-
sional right has been previously allowed. 288 The courts, how-
ever, have been reluctant to redress an issue involving
Congress unless that legislator has been denied his or her
right to participate in the legislative process.28 9 If the legisla-
tor has had the opportunity to participate in voting regarding
the passage of deficit budgets, he or she may find it difficult
to allege that a right of participation in the legislative process
has been denied.29 °
As an additional hurdle, the member of Congress will be
denied standing if the alleged activity can be redressed by his
or her "colleagues."291 This particular hurdle may be difficult
to surmount because the judiciary, already reluctant to be-
come involved with legislative activities, may see the deficit
as an issue that can be addressed by Congress, however un-
likely it is that the problem will actually be solved. A well
crafted argument, listing all of Congress' failed attempts at
solving the deficit problem,292 may help to convince the court
that the Congress member's colleagues are completely inca-
pable of redressing the plaintiffs injury, and therefore the
courts should consider the challenge.
Another possibility for a member of Congress to sue is
based on an alleged injury to Congress itself.293 It would
probably be difficult for the congressional plaintiff to allege
that Congress has been injured by its members' conduct, and
therefore this argument appears futile. A possible argument,
however, that Congress has been severely injured by the defi-
cit could be formulated based on the many hours of time
286. See supra text accompanying notes 168-208.
287. See Harrington, 553 F.2d at 214.
288. See e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 168-208.
290. See generally Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 430.
291. Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F. 2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
292. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 71-101.
293. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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spent each year by Senate and House members trying to gen-
erate solutions to the budget crisis.
As another allegation of injury, a member of Congress
could assert that continued passage of, or overriding of, budg-
etary items infringes his or her rights to represent his or her
constituency.294 Because of issues including injury and sepa-
ration of powers and the member's ability to access the polit-
ical process, it may be difficult for the member to urge review
of these issues, especially if he or she has participated in the
voting process. 295
To be allowed representational standing, as required by
Hunt, the member of Congress would have to meet the tests
for associational standing.296 The member could allege that
members of his or her constituency would have standing to
sue as individuals; they do have a concrete injury, because
fifteen percent of the constituents' taxes are being used to fi-
nance the debt.297 As a member of Congress, the legislator's
interest is in the welfare and fair treatment of all of his or her
constituents, and the claim itself does not require participa-
tion of the large class of people, as required by Hunt.298 In
fact, it actually precludes the inclusion of so many litigants,
since all taxpayers are impacted by deficit spending. Oppo-
nents may argue that participation of the constituents is nec-
essary because so many diverse interests would be repre-
sented.29 9 If, however, the member of Congress represented a
narrow band of plaintiffs with the same type of injury claims
(for example, loss of Medicare benefits) instead of the entire
constituency, it may be more valid to assert these interests,
as all these plaintiffs would have the same goals and
priorities.
Even if standing is allowed, the courts will still address
political question and prudential concerns. °° Questions of
separation-of-powers concerns must also be addressed.3"'
294. See supra text accompanying notes 198-204.
295. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 203-204.
297. See supra text accompanying note 5.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 203-204.
299. See, e.g., Dessem, supra note 202, at 21.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 168-208.




Assuming that standing issues do not bar judicial review,
the Court may also apply the political question doctrine to
preclude a challenge to annual deficit spending.3 °2 How
strictly would the courts apply the political question analysis
in a case that involved a challenge to the constitutionality of
annual deficit spending? Based upon the political nature of
the challenge, it could be expected that the Court's concerns
in the political question area would be many.
In the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has actually
moved toward a role that involves review of more political
questions.3 °3 In fact, the judiciary has thrust itself into ar-
guably political areas, including presidential immunity, 0 4
budget processes,305 the death penalty,30 6 and legislative
veto.30 7 In fact, it can be argued that almost every constitu-
tional issue involves broad political concerns.30 8 It has even
been suggested that the political question doctrine may be
"ripe for discarding."30 9 The political question doctrine, how-
ever, still remains a large concern to the courts,310 and there-
fore, the issues set forth in this doctrine must be addressed.
In questions of justiciability, the courts often are con-
cerned with whether there are manageable standards for
resolving the issue at hand.3 11 By using the congressional
definition of its borrowing power, the Court can jump this
legal hurdle, since Congress has already stated it is "neces-
sary and proper" to reduce the deficit. 312 Congress has there-
fore handed the courts a standard for review.
The courts also are concerned about becoming involved
in determining governmental policy.313 Again, Congress has
given a definition of its fiscal policy by continually reiterating
the need for a budgetary balance. As stated above, with its
concern about standards for review, the Court need not be
302. See supra text accompanying notes 212-219.
303. See Nagel, supra note 213, at 650.
304. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
305. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
306. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
307. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
308. Nagel, supra note 213, at 668.
309. Id. at 668.
310. Id. at 668-69.
311. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
312. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 258-261.
313. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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concerned that it is making an initial policy consideration,
since the determination of a need to reduce the deficit has
already been made by Congress and not by the judiciary.3 14
Where an issue is committed to another coordinate
branch of government, the judiciary will be reluctant to grant
review unless the action directly violates the Constitution.315
The Court, however, has recognized that even where issues
are committed to a single branch, the Court still must review
clearly unconstitutional actions.3 16 Because our founding fa-
thers did not envision continuous deficit spending,317 and be-
cause Congress has already deemed it inappropriate,3 18 the
judiciary must review whether the Congress is acting consti-
tutionally in its use of the borrowing power. Even if the Con-
stitution relegates the power to spend and borrow to the Con-
gress, if there is a usurpation of a Constitutional power
beyond what was envisioned by our founding fathers, the ju-
diciary must intervene.
If the resolution of the issue would result in a lack of re-
spect for another branch of government, the Court will also
deny review.3 19 Although the judiciary may be concerned
that a decision regarding the constitutionality of the deficit
may embarrass Congress by essentially declaring Congress
incompetent, it must realize that Congress has already em-
barrassed itself by its own budgetary antics. In fact, a deci-
sion regarding the constitutionality of the deficit may give
new credibility to the federal government as a whole. Con-
gress would then have a definitive benchmark and would be
given a final answer to the question whether it should con-
tinue to spend above funding. A decision by the judiciary
would also provide a measure of accountability for Congress
and provide an explanation to the people of the United States
why cuts in funding are necessary. As a result, Congress will
become a more respected branch of the government. More-
over, embarrassing another branch of government has not
been an area of immense concern to the judiciary, as demon-
strated by its past pronouncements that can arguably be
314. See supra text accompanying notes 258-261.
315. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 135-136.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 258-261.
319. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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viewed as causing embarrassment to other branches of
government.32 °
The courts will also deny review when they find that a
political decision has already been made. 321 Actually, this
prong of the political question doctrine should convince a
court to review a challenge to annual deficit spending. Con-
gress has proclaimed its desire to balance the budget numer-
ous times, yet it has acted in a directly contrary fashion. The
Court, therefore, must consider a challenge to deficit spend-
ing, since Congress has not made the "political decision" to
affirmatively act and reduce spending.
In addition, courts will shy away from adjudication of a
particular issue where a decision would potentially conflict
with pronouncements of other departments. 22 Again, the ju-
diciary should not be concerned with this prong of the polit-
ical question doctrine. If the judiciary, however, pronounces
annual deficit spending unconstitutional, it will actually have
joined the Congress and the executive branch in their belief
that it is necessary to reduce, and eventually eliminate, an-
nual deficit spending.
3. Prudential Considerations
Finally, a question arises whether the courts will still de-
cline jurisdiction based solely on their own prudential discre-
tion.323 Even if jurisdiction and standing are established, a
court may elect to decline review.324 Whether based on sepa-
ration-of-powers concerns or on issues that are exceedingly
controversial or complex, a court may still decide to defer the
decision. 25
Courts often deny review of a case when they decide that
the "political process" is the best place for resolution.
3 26 If
the processes of the democratic election system will solve the
problem, the courts should not get involved. 27 It would be
inappropriate for a court to deny review of a challenge to the
320. For example, the Court has declared that a President is not completely
immune from the judicial process. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
321. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
322. Id.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 220-227.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 220-227.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70, 220-227.
326. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979).
327. Id.
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constitutionality of annual federal deficit spending based on
the premise that the political process will handle the prob-
lem. If the political process could solve the problem, there
certainly would not have been a deficit every year for the past
twenty years. The political process as it stands today is not
working, and consequently, judicial review is required.
Whether a court would elect to review this hot issue is
completely questionable. Unfortunately, if review is denied
on the basis of prudential concerns, there is nothing that the
litigant can do to force the issue. A well drafted, precise
pleading, however, may reduce the risks of denial if the com-
plaint articulates the unconstitutionality of spending beyond
means and addresses the courts' potential prudential
concerns.
F. Congress Granting Jurisdiction or Standing
To further convince the court to review a challenge, Con-
gress could confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court
or relax standing requirements. 28 It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that Congress would be able to receive the majority ap-
proval required to confer jurisdiction or would even want to
pursue the matter, since it would, in effect, be admitting that
it cannot solve the problem on its own. Nonetheless, if Con-
gress did confer jurisdiction, the Court may be more amena-
ble to political question concerns.
An argument against a congressional grant of original ju-
risdiction to the Supreme Court is dependent on how broadly
the proposed grant is drafted. In order to be constitutional,
Congress cannot give away so much of its powers as to jeop-
ardize the balance of powers between the branches.3 29 For
example, if Congress gave the Court the power to review spe-
cific budgetary appropriations, the Court may deem this too
much congressional power in the judiciary, because the Con-
stitution specifically grants this power to Congress. If Con-
gress, however, simply granted jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court to determine the constitutionality of overall deficit
spending, the Court may be more open to review, since it has
declared itself the final determiner of whether congressional
actions are constitutional.3 ° Original jurisdiction, however,
328. See supra text accompanying notes 228-231.
329. See, e.g., supra note 91.
330. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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would give the Court a way to get past its political question
and prudential concerns, since the grant would coincide with
the belief of Congress that the judiciary can constitutionally
review this matter.
Congress could also confer more favorable standing re-
quirements to allow a party standing on a particular mat-
ter.3 3 1 Even if Congress did grant more lenient standing re-
quirements, the Court will still apply a causation test to
ensure that the harm alleged is causally connected to the al-
leged unconstitutional action.332 If Congress did grant a
plaintiff standing as a matter of right to challenge the consti-
tutionality of deficit spending, the plaintiff could then argue
that he or she has injury in fact and the injury is causally
connected to annual deficit spending. 33
G. The Appropriate Level of Judicial Scrutiny
If the Court did grant review of a challenge to deficit
spending, the question remains whether the Court would be
as deferential to matters that involve the public debt as it has
been with issues regarding congressional interpretations of
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 3 4 A persuasive argument for the Court to apply a
higher level of scrutiny than deferential review is difficult to
formulate unless the party can show a legitimate usurpation
of constitutional power.335
Therefore, the litigant will have a much better chance if
he or she can persuade the court that the action is repugnant
to the Constitution. Any act found to be repugnant to the
Constitution is void. 36 In scrutinizing the action, the courts
must look directly to the Constitution for guidance.337 As the
Court found in Marbury v. Madison,338 the meaning of consti-
tutional phrases is measured by what the framers contem-
plated. 39 If the meaning of a phrase has not been previously
331. See supra text accompanying notes 228-231.
332. See generally supra text accompanying notes 143-208.
333. See generally supra text accompanying notes 258-261.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
335. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
336. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
337. Id. at 176.
338. Id. at 180.
339. Id.
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explained, the court must look to what was contemplated by
the framers.34 °
As previously discussed, the framers of our Constitution
were explicit in their belief that the debt should be re-
duced. 341 Additionally, Congress has added its interpretation
that deficit spending is not appropriate.342 With these two
explanations, the judiciary has every tool available to make a
decision about the constitutionality of annual deficit spend-
ing and the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.
Further, the courts cannot merely assume that Congress
has actually debated and decided that its actions are consti-
tutionally justified. Where Congress has specifically stated
that an action is not appropriate, it is especially imperative
that the judiciary review the issue with more than a deferen-
tial standard. Therefore, the courts must review a challenge
to the constitutionality of annual federal deficit spending
with a higher level of scrutiny and must not simply defer to
the presumption of legislative validity. Congress and the
framers of the Constitution have expressly stated that deficit
spending is only appropriate during periods of war.343 It is
not appropriate on a continuing basis.
IV. PROPOSAL
The courts should consider reviewing an action challeng-
ing the constitutionality of annual deficit spending. A debt
that occurs on an annual basis, in the absence of war, is inap-
propriate and unconstitutional.344  Absent constitutional
amendments that include enforceability provisions that can-
not be overridden by Congress, the budget will most likely
not be balanced without judicial review.
Further, Congress should grant the Supreme Court origi-
nal jurisdiction to review matters challenging the constitu-
tionality of the deficit in order to show its commitment to
solving the deficit problem. In addition, Congress should
grant relaxed standing requirements to enable the Court to
review the matter. To imagine Congress taking this step is
difficult. This step, however, may be the only way in which to
address the issue.
340. Id.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
342. S. REP. No. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 22 (1985).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
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Absent a grant of original jurisdiction from Congress, if
the judiciary is asked to review the issue, it need not be con-
cerned with political question issues primarily because Con-
gress and the framers of our Constitution have already ex-
pressed an opinion about the appropriateness of annual
deficit spending. Consequently, a party attacking the consti-
tutionality of deficit spending is directly attacking congres-
sional power under a specific article of the Constitution. This
scenario satisfies the Flast test for standing because the
party can show a substantial and causally linked injury; fif-
teen percent of the nation's annual budget goes to financing
the debt.345
Unless one of the above political question concerns is ap-
plicable, the Court has stated that a challenge should not be
dismissed.346 Based on previous congressional interpreta-
tions of deficit spending and previous judicial rulings regard-
ing political question concerns, the Court should not dismiss
a challenge to the constitutionality of annual federal deficit
spending based on political question grounds.34 7 Further, if
Congress were to grant the Supreme Court original jurisdic-
tion to review cases involving challenges to the annual fed-
eral deficit, or if it were to grant relaxed standing require-
ments for this type of question, a court should be even more
willing to review such a challenge.
If a group of taxpayers collaborated with a group of con-
gressional members to challenge the constitutionality of an-
nual deficit spending, standing and justiciability questions
would be even less problematic. The Court should recognize
that Congress and the executive branch are at such an im-
passe that the basic nature of our government is threatened.
A judicial ruling that annual deficit spending is unconstitu-
tional and that the problem be abrogated with "all deliberate
speed" may be the only solution. Further, by using this type
of order, the Court would not be forced to request an all-or-
nothing approach to solving the deficit problem. Therefore,
the court need not be concerned with invading the powers of
other government branches. A judicial ruling on the constitu-
tionality of annual deficit spending is the only way for parti-
345. See supra text accompanying notes 5, 147-151.
346. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
347. See generally supra text accompanying notes 302-322.
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san politics to be removed from the budget issue and for our
country to get back on its economic track.
By applying a stricter test to the power of Congress to
borrow, the courts can still bow to the legislators' definition of
what is necessary and proper to congressional spending pow-
ers. The interpretation of this power may also take into con-
sideration that there may be true emergencies, such as war,
where it does become appropriate and therefore "necessary
and proper" to spend beyond means. The Court could also
suggest a timetable for the reduction of spending, and could
compel Congress to set up strict enforceability provisions to
ensure that the budget is balanced on an annual basis. This
can be accomplished without sending our country into eco-
nomic hardship from an immediate cut of $300 billion in fis-
cal spending.
Although the economic impact of a cut in spending may
be problematic, the Court must recognize that a continuation
of the current policy could result in catastrophic harm at a
later date. It is not equitable that the present generation
places such an onerous burden on future generations. 348 If
spending beyond our means continues, it could literally force
our country into bankruptcy.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary must
recognize that Congress, on its own, is incapable of resolving
the annual debt. It will take not only the efforts of the legis-
lature and the executive branch, but also those of the judici-
ary to "get the ball rolling" to financial reform. Current gen-
erations and future generations rely on somebody taking the
situation to heart and seriously considering the constitution-
ality of a $4 trillion debt that continues to grow at a stagger-
ing rate. To reduce spending, we cannot continue to allow it
to grow. We must all be willing to suffer some pain for long-
term gain. To do this, all branches of the government, includ-
ing the judiciary, must be involved to the limits of their con-
stitutional abilities, and the judiciary should be amenable to
considering a challenge to the constitutionality of continuous
spending beyond means.
Ondrea D. Riley
348. See generally Lindley, supra note 56.
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